One of the difficult problems in decision analysis relates to the situation, when the decision must be undertaken by a committee. There exist several formalizations of decision making process based on the utility function approach. This approach is however very difficult to apply in the group decision case, since the number of coefficients characterizing the utility function is very high and it is practically impossible to directly identify such utility function. Therefore, reduction of dimensionality of the parameter space is necessary.
In this paper a concept of convex dependence between two conflicting decision makers is presented. This concept was effectively used by the author to develop a decomposition principle of the group utility function as well as to formulate the conditions necessary to perform such a decomposition. The concept was successfully applied for a practical example.
The paper was presented by the author at IIASA and at the Symposium "Systems Analysis and Simulation". It is one of the results of a cooperation between the SDS and Japanese researchers in decision analysis. it is practically impossible to directly identify a multiattribute utility function. Therefore, it is necessary to develop conditions that reduce the dimensionality of the functions that are required to identify. These conditions restrict the form of a multiattribute utility function in a decomposition theorem. Keeney and Kirkwood (1975) have extended the multiattribute utility theory for a decision maker to a group utility theory for multiple conflicting decision makers where a group utility function is constructed postulating the utility independence properties among the multiple decision makers.
In this paper after briefly describing a single-attribute utility function based on von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1944) expected utility hypothesis, additive, multilinear, and convex decompositions are described for multiattribute utility functions. These decompositions are based on additive and utility independence (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976 ) and convex dependence (Tamura and Nakamura, 1983) conditions, respectively. The concept of convex dependence is a generalized concept of utility independence where we consider the change of decision maker's attitude towards risk. This concept generates various decompositions which include Keeney's additive/multiplicative decompositions as special cases. For clarifying the interpretation of this concept an example of trading-off between environment and consumption is included (Tamura and Nakamura, 1978) .
For group decision making with multiple decision makers we describe the concept of convex dependence between two (conflicting) decision makers (Tamura and Yukimura, 1983) . This concept can represent the change of attitude of each decision maker towards the group utility depending upon the utility level of the other decision maker. For clarifying the interpretation of this concept a hypothetical numerical example for siting a major airport is included.
As a possible directions for further research, value theoretic approach to riskless and/or risky preference representation is mentioned.
In this approach the concept of strength-of-preference (Fishburn, 1970 and Dyer and Sarin, 1979) plays an important role. 
Utility Decompositions Based on Additive and Utility Independence
The following results are the essential summary of Keeney and Raiffa (1976) .
Let a specific consequence XEX be characterized by two attributes Similarly u2(z 1 y) on Z is also defined by 0 where it is assumed that u(y,z*) > u(y,x 1-
From DEFINITIONS 3 and 4 the following equations hold, if Y(U1)Z.
In other words utility independence implies that the normalized conditional utility functions do not depend on the different conditional levels. 7). Therefore, the additive independence is a special case of mutual utility independence.
Utilitv Decom~ositions Based on Convex De~endence
The following results are due to Tamura and Nakamura (1983) . This On two scalar attributes the difference between the conditional utility functions necessary to construct the previous decomposition models and the convex decomposition models is shown in Fig. 4 . By assessing utilities on the heavy shaded lines and points, we can completely specify the utility function in the cases indicated in Fig. 4 . As seen from Fig. 4 , the advantage of the convex decomposition is that only single-attribute conditional utility functions need to be assessed even for high-order convex dependent case. Therefore, it is relatively easy to identify the utility functions. Fishburn and Farquhar (1982) have established an axiomatic approach for selecting a basis of normalized conditional utility function.
2.4.

Interpretation of Convex Dependence
For describing the interpretation of convex dependence between two different attributes, we discuss the utility for environment and consumption (Tamura and Nakamura, 1978) . In this problem there exists conflict between these two attributes, because the more we consume the more we pollute. It will be shown that the two attributes, environment and consumption, do not satisfy the utility independence property.
Therefore, we may want to take into account the convex dependence prcr perty.
Let Y and Z be the attributes of environment and consumption, respectively, and eeY and CEZ be the attribute levels. We restrict these 0 attribute levels in eoS e (_ -e* and coS c 5 -c* where e = e means environment is polluted and is in the worst level, e = e* means no 0 pollution exists and environment is clean, c = c means consumption is in the lowest level, and c = C* in the highest level.
Now we consider how a normalized conditional utility function ul(elc) for environment changes depending upon the consumption level c.
It is evident that the preference for environment changes according to 0 the consumption level c. Comparing ul(e(c*) with ul(e(c ) these normalized conditional utility function is drawn schematically in Fig. 5 a) .
When c = c*, even if the environment is deteriorated from the clean level (e = e*), the decrease of utility is not so rapid in compensation for high consumption, but as the environment level approaches to the worst level, the utility for the environment decreases rapidly. When c 0 = c , the decrease of utility for environment is even for any envirorr mental level, because the consumption level is suppressed to a low level.
Next, we consider how a normalized conditional utility function u (cle) for consumption changes depending upon the environmental level. 2 0 Comparing u (cle*) with u2(cle ) these normalized conditional utility 2 function is drawn schematically in Fig. 5 b) . Wb3-t e = e*, utility for consumption increases according to the law of diminishing marginal u-0 tility. On the other hand, when e = e , they feel that the high consumption is a matter of course, therefore, the rate of increase of utility for the unit increase of the consumption level is very small when the consumption level is low. But the utility for consumption increases according to the law of diminishing marginal utility after the consumption level moves to higher level.
Accordingly, the trade-off between environment and consumption does not satisfy the utility independence property, and hence taking into account the convex dependence property we could construct an appropriate utility function.
ALGORITHM OF IDENTIFYING MULTIATTRIBUTE UTILITY FUNCTIONS
For identifying a multiattribute utility function under the convex dependence condition (including 0-th order), we need to find the order of convex dependence. This order can be assessed as in the following steps: Define
0
Step 0. Normalized conditional utility functions ul(y lz 1, ul(ylz*), Step 1. n= 1
Step 2. Normalized conditional utility functions u (ylz ),u (y~zl),~~~, 1 0 1 ul(ylzn) and ul(ylz*) are assessed, and then ln and Un are obtained.
Step 3. Linear equation
is solved with respect to in.
Step 4. We draw the graph of
Step 5. The graph of f(y) is compared with the graph of ul(y(zn).
If
we can regard that both curves are coincident within the allowable error, we decide that Y(CDn)Z. If not, n+l+n and then go back to Step 2.
These steps can be easily realized by using a graphic terminal of a large computer.
Parameters a and b which appeared in THEOREMS 1 to 5 can be estimated as follows: We ask the decision maker the indifference probability p such that Then, we obtain Similarly, we ask the decision maker the indifference probability q such that Then, we obtain After obtaining the information for the order of convex dependence, normalized conditional utility functions and the scaling parameters a and b, we can construct a multiattribute utility function by using a decomposition form described in THEOREMS 1 to 5. For two attribute cases we could draw indifference curves for the multiattribute utility function in two attribute space YxZ.
GROUP UTILITY THEORY
In the previous methods of social choice or group decision making the preference attitude of each decision maker (individual member of the group) has been described without taking into account the utility level (level of satisfaction) of the other decision makers, and such preference structures have been aggregated by some rule for group decision making. Keeney and Kirkwood's (1975) approach is also in this cat- In real situation the preference attitude of each decision maker heavily depends on the outcomes or utility levels obtained by the other decision makers. For example a decision maker is satisfied with his low outcome and he feels that the group utility is relatively high even if his own utility level is low, when the other decision maker's utility level or outcome is lower than or equal to his outcome. On the contrary, the same decision maker is not satisfied with his high outcome when the other decision maker's outcome is higher than his outcome. Hence, the utility independence assumption among the multiple decision makers is not appropriate.
Essentially, in real social choice the individual's preference which is based only on his benefit, should not be reflected to the society. Instead, the individual's preference which is based on social ethics or moral, should be reflected.
Systematic methodologies for such societal decision have been missing and have been desired in many fields; economics, politics, behavioral science, operations research, and so forth.
In this section a group utility theory is described based on the concept of convex dependence. The group decision making by two (conflicting) decision makers is considered, where we discuss a systematic way of describing each decision maker's preference which depends on the utility level of the other decision maker.
In other words, change of attitude of each decision maker towards the group utility is described depending upon the utility level of the other decision maker.
Group utility function is then constructed by aggregating such preference of each decision maker.
The following development is due to Tamura and Yukimura (1983) .
DEFINITION 7. Let U1xU2 denote the utility function space, and let denote the utility function decision maker 1 (DM1) and DM2 on the multiattribute consequence spaces X1 and X2, respectively, where x.EX~ (i = 1,2) denotes a specific consequence for 1
DMi.
A group utility function W(x1,x2) is assumed to be described as
We shall simplify the notation as follows:
0 where x and x * denote the worst and the best consequences of DMi, i i 0 respectively, and hence ui and ui* denote.the utility level of DMi for the worst and the best consequences, respectively. We will describe how to construct w(ul,u2) in the following.
Given an arbitrary u2~U2 a normalized -conditional &roup utility function (NCGUF) w1(u11u2) of DM1 on U1 is defined by
where it is assumed that w(ul*,u2) > w(ul ,u2), ulO= 0, ul*= 1.
Then, w1(u1(u2) is normalized as
Similarly, NCGUF of DM2 w2(u21u1) can be defined by where w(ul ,u2*) > W(U~,U~~), u2 O= 0, u2*=l. It is also assumed that the group utility function w(ul,u2) is normalized so that
From mathematical point of view formulas of group utility functions are identical with those of multiattribute utility functions. In THEOREMS 1 to 5 if we replace the symbols as shown in Table 1 , we could obtain the decomposition forms of group utility functions.
NCGUF (24) of DM1 represents his subjective preference structure for the group utility as a function of his own utility level under the condition that the utility level of DM2 is given. NCGUFs (24) and (25) will play an important role for constructing a group utility function.
Convex dependence between two decision makers is defined as follows:
DEFINITION 9. Utility of DM1 is said to be n-th order convex dependent on the utility of DM2, denoted U1(CDn)U2, if NCGUF of DM1 wl(ul Iu2) can be described as a convex combination of (dl) NCGUFs of DM1 w1 (ul IU~~), i = O,l, ..., n with different conditional levels.
For clarifying the interpretation of convex dependence between two (conflicting) decision makers, we deal with a decision making prob lem for siting a major airport, where we describe how to represent
NCGUFs of each decision maker taking into account the situation of the other decision maker.
Let DM1 be the representative of the regional inhabitants and DM2 the representative of the developer of the airport. Existence of a benevolent dictator, who mediates DM1 and DM2 by assessing the scaling coefficients, is postulated. We can regard that DM1 wishes to construct the airport as far from the regional area as possible for reducing the environmental negative effect of the airport. On the other hand, DM2
wishes to construct the airport at the closer location to city for convenience and efficiency of the airport. Therefore, DM1 and DM2 are ob viously conflicting.
We consider two mutually utility independent cases and one mutually first order convex dependent case and interpret each case.
Case A: U1(MUI)U2
Suppose the certainty equivalents and the resulting NCGUFs of DM1 and DM2 are assessed as shown in Fig. 6 . Convex NCGUFs in this figure show that both DM1 and DM2 do not think that the group utility is high unless the utility levels of their own are very high, and that each DM'S attitude towards the group utility does not depend on the utility level of the other DM. In other words, each DM is mutually utility independent and their attitude is selfish and stubborn.
In this case the group utility function is described as the group utility function is described as Case C: U1(CD1)U2 and U2(CD1)U1
Suppose the certainty equivalents and the resulting NCGUFs of DM1 and DM2 are assessed as shown in Fig. 8 .
Furthermore, suppose the first order convex dependence between DM1 and DM2 is assured. This means that preference attitude of DM1 (DM2) to the group utility varies depending upon the utility level of DM2 (DMl). Even when the utility 0 level of DM2 is at the worst level (u2 --U2 ), the attitude of DM1 towards the group utility is selfish for low ul, because the environmental impact of the airport to DM1 is straightforward. But for higher u1 the attitude of DM1 is changed to be more gentle.
On the other hand, when the utility level of DM2 is at the best level (u2 = u2*), the attitude of DM1 towards the group utility is always selfish. In other words, when the utility level of DM2 is high, DM1 does not feel that group utility is high unless his own utility level is very high. This can be interpreted that in the group decision DM1 is claiming equity by comparing his own utility level with that of DM2.
When the utility level of DM1 is at the worst level (ul = ulO), the attitude of DM2 is gentle and sympathetic, but when the utility level of DM1 is at the best level (ul = ul*), the attitude of DM2 is changed to be slightly self-centered.
In this case the group utility function is described as Eqn. (15) where the symbols in Eqn. (15) are replaced according as Table 1 .
As shown in Case C the concept of convex dependence makes it possible to describe in NCGUFs the change of attitude of each decision maker depending upon the utility level of the other decision maker. By using the group utility theory based on the concept of convex dependence, it is possible to offer clear information of various preference orderings for the alternatives depending upon the various attitude of each decision maker in the group and various cases for the values of scaling coefficients assessed by a benevolent dictator.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Centering around the concept of convex dependence multiattribute utility theory and group utility theory are briefly surveyed for multiobjective decision making. A major advantage of the convex decomposition is that they include many previous decompositions such as additive, multiplicative, bilateral and interpolation decompositions as special cases. Therefore, depending upon the complexity of trade-offs the convex decompositions could provide more flexible multiattribute and/or group utility functions for modeling preferences of a decision maker or multiple (conflicting) decision makers.
Since the convex decompositions need only single-attribute utility functions even for high-order convex dependent cases, it is relatively easy to identify the multiattribute utility functions. Graphic terminals of a large-scale computer could be effectively used for this pur pose.
We didn't include value theoretic approach (Dyer and Sarin, 1979, and Sarin, 1983) in this paper, however, riskless and/or risky prefer ence representation based on the value theoretic approach is an impor tant topic for further research. Under this approach it might be possible to discriminate a decision maker's strength-of-preference and the attitude towards risk.
The approach described in this paper are based on the expected utility hypothesis of von Neurnann and Morgenstern (1944) . Many paradoxes (e.g. Allais and Hagen, 1979, and Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) have been observed which violate particular axioms. For overcoming this difficulty nonlinear utility analysis (Nakamura, 1984) is being investigated.
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FIGURE 5
Normalized conditional utility functions for environment and consumption.
FIGURE 6
NCGUFs for Case A.
